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Summary 
Despite the rapid growth of the European VC market, few Chinese academic 
researchers have studied it. In this paper, I make a detailed description of the 
European venture capital market, and hope to withdraw some lessons from Europe 
for the development of the venture capital market in China. 
After some theoretical reviews about the definition of venture capital, the structure of 
a venture capital market and the determinants of venture capital investments, the 
paper describes the history and recent developments in the European venture capital 
market. The items covered include fundraising, source of funding, investment 
volume, stage distribution of investment, industrial distribution of investment, the 
internal rate of return for different kind of venture capital investments and the legal 
and tax environment for venture capital in Europe. I hope these latest data can be 
informative for academics, regulators and VC fund managers alike in China. 
Then I discuss the economic impact of venture capital on the sustainable economic 
growth, innovation and job creation in European. Most government agencies and 
researchers claimed that venture capital investment is beneficial to innovations and 
job creations. The survey of EVCA also provides data to support these ideas. Job 
creations in venture-backed firms are much higher than traditional companies, and the 
innovation activities in these companies are also higher than the average. 
The survey of the European venture capital market finds that the development of the 
venture capital market is quite imbalanced in Europe. To answer the question what 
determines the equilibrium amount of venture capital investments in a country, I 
develop models to explain it. The basic model is similar to that developed by Romain 
and van Pottelsberghe (2003). However, I introduce a microeconomic perspective to 
construct the supply function of VC funds. And I also extend the model by including 
the legal environment in the demand function of VC funds.  
The empirical analysis is run, using the dataset covering 15 European countries over 
the period 2002-2008. Other than previous researches, I use the public R&D 
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expenditures to reflect the entrepreneurial environment of the economy, because I 
want to find whether public R&D expenditures can be used as a policy tool to 
stimulate the venture capital activities in a country. The regression results show that 
the venture capital investment is positively related to the GDP growth rate, depth of 
the capital market, entrepreneurial environments and public R&D expenditures. 
However, my analysis focus is on how legal environments and the type of legal 
system matters in the determination of VC investments. The analysis shows that a bad 
legal environment will diminish the effectiveness of public R&D expenses on VC 
investments. And whether a country adopts case law tradition also influences the 
effectiveness of public R&D expenses on VC investments.  
After that, the paper analyzes the recent development of the venture capital market in 
China, makes a comparison with the Europe and concludes some potential problems 
hindering the development of VC market in China. At last I provide some policy 
suggestions for Chinese government using experience from Europe, including 
speeding up the construction of a multi-level capital market in China, making more 
public investments in scientific researches and education programmes and creating a 
favourable environment for venture capital activities. 
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1. Introduction 
Since it first emerged in 1940s in the United States, the venture capital has gone 
through a 70-year’s history of development. However, it is still quite a mystery for 
many people, especially those in developing countries like China.  
The emergence of VC industry was to some extent triggered by the fact that most 
small and medium-sized business (SMEs) were in shortage of capital for daily 
operation or expansion. And venture capital could serve as an important financing 
source for those companies. Researches also find that the venture capital activity has 
a positive impact not only on the promotion of enterprises but also on economic 
growth. Astrid Romain and Bruno van Pottelsberghe (2003) found the positive 
relationship between the venture capital activity and the economic growth with panel 
data of 16 OECD countries from 1990 to 1998.  
Besides, venture capital can boost the prosperity of innovation activities. Florida and 
Smith (1990) found that the venture capital activity was closely related to high-tech 
resources. The correlation coefficient between the number of VC firms and the 
number of high-tech companies was 0.954, and the coefficient between the amount of 
VC investment and the number of high-tech companies was 0.982. Samuel Kortum & 
Josh Lerner (2000) illustrated that the increasing of venture capital would increase the 
number of patents. And they estimated that the contribution of venture capital to the 
amount of innovations in U.S. was about 8% during 1983 to 1992. 
What’s more venture capital is also helpful for the creation of jobs. Dirk Engel (2004) 
checked the job creation function of European VC investments by comparing 
European surviving venture-backed firms with surviving non-venture-backed firms 
and found that the number of employees in venture-backed grew much quicker than 
those without venture backgrounds. 
These three functions of venture capital were especially meaningful for the European 
economy which has suffered from the high unemployment rate and the low economic 
growth rate for quite a long time. The European Union (EU) and governments of 
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most European countries pay an extraordinary attention to the development of their 
VC markets. As a result, the European venture capital market has become the second 
largest among all regions in the world. 
Despite the rapid growth of the European VC market, it still hasn’t drawn attention 
from Chinese academic researchers. As I can find from WanFang1 database, only a 
handful of papers explore the issue in Europe, most of which with extremely old set 
of data. And venture capital itself is quite new to the Chinese economy. As the 
second board2 was launched in October 2009 in China, the surge of venture capital 
investments is about to come. At this very moment, make a detailed exploration of 
the world’s second largest venture capital market will give us lots of apocalypses and 
lead us to the right way of better developments. 
In this paper, I wish to picture a vast panorama of the European venture capital 
market, which would be informative for academics, regulators and VC fund managers 
alike. The paper will be arranged as follows. After some theoretical reviews about the 
definition of venture capital, the structure of a venture capital market and the 
determinants of venture capital investments in Section 2, Section 3 gives a short 
review of the history of European venture capital. Section 4 illustrates the recent 
developments in the European VC market; describes the legal and tax environment 
and checks out the economic impact of VC activities on the European economy. 
Section 5 establishes models to find potential factors that determine the equilibrium 
amount of venture capital investments. And Section 6 runs an empirical test on 15 
European countries over the period 2002-2008, using the model derived from section 
5. The software for running regression analysis is Stata 8. After some description of 
Chinese VC developments in recent years in section 7, section 8 makes a conclusion 
and provides some policy suggestions for Chinese governments about the future 
development of venture capital market in China. 
                                              
1 A Chinese paper database that compromises most academic papers in China. 
2 The second board refers to the seperate market for smaller companies that haven’t meet requirements of main board 
listing. NASDAQ is the most famous second board in the world. 
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2. Definition and overview 
2.1 Definition  
The definition of venture capital itself is somewhat ambiguous and has different 
meanings in different situations. In US, venture capital refers to a subset of private 
equity that provides capital for early-stage, high-potential and growth companies. As 
the academic authority Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner (1997) define, venture capital 
investments are investments in equity or equity-linked securities of private firms, 
with active participation by the fund managers in the management or oversight of the 
firms. However, the meaning of venture capital in Europe is interchangeable with 
private equity. The European venture capital and private equity association (EVCA) 
defines venture capital or private equity as providing equity capital to enterprises not 
quoted on a stock market. In this paper, I’ll follow the European tradition and use the 
latter definition of venture capital. 
2.2 The structure of a venture capital market 
There are lots of players in a venture capital market that can be divided into three 
categories: investors, intermediaries and portfolio companies. Investors in the market 
include financial institutions like banks, pension funds etc., corporations and wealthy 
individuals. Portfolio companies refer to those high growth-potential ventures that 
receive venture capital investments. And venture capital firms serve as intermediaries 
to transfer money from investors to portfolio companies. These three kinds of players 
compose the organism of a complete venture capital market. 
The function of the venture capital market is quite similar to that of the stock market. 
Actually it is a subset of the capital market, serving as an important channel of direct 
financing. The differences lie in the fact that companies receiving external financing 
in the venture capital market are generally too small to be listed on the stock market 
and venture capital firms usually give more management supports to their portfolio 
companies, while most investors in the stock market don’t involve in the daily 
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business of their investee companies. The figure below describes the typical process 
of venture capital investments. 
 
Figure 2. 1 The venture capital investment process. Source: Mason and 
Harrison, 2002 
2.3 What determines venture capital investments? 
So what makes a country’s venture capital market thriving, or what determines 
venture capital investments in a country? Some articles try to answer the problem 
from macroeconomic perspective. Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2003) wrote that 
only two articles attempted to evaluate quantitatively the macroeconomic 
determinants of VC so far: Jeng and Wells (2000) develop a model and test it on a 
cross-section of 21 countries over a period of 10 years. Gompers and Lerner (1998) 
do the test on the US economy over the period 1969-1994. Romain and van 
Pottelsberghe (2003) themselves improve the theoretical model and conclude that the 
determinants of VC are related to macroeconomic conditions, research efforts, 
technology opportunity and the entrepreneurial environment. Their model is 
econometrically evaluated with a panel dataset of 16 OECD countries over the period 
1990-1998. Bonini and Alkan (2009) further developed the model to include political 
factors like corruption, internal conflicts and socio-economic conditions etc. The 
main results of their research can be summarized as the following table.  
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Table 2. 1 Potential determinants of VC investments 
Potential 
Determinants 
Bonini and 
Alkan (2009)
Romain and van 
Pottelsberghe 
(2003) 
Jeng and Wells 
(2000) 
Gompers and 
Lerner (1998)
Economic Variables 
IPO Not significant n.a. 
Postive, except 
for early stage 
funds 
No effect at 
aggregate level
GDP Growth Not significant Positive Not significant Postive 
Stock Market Postive n.a. Not significant Postive 
Interest Rates Negative Positive n.a. 
Postive at 
aggregate level, 
negative at state 
level 
Inflation Negative n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Technology 0pportunities 
R&D Postive Positive n.a. Positive at state level 
R&D Capital 
stock n.a. Positive n.a. n.a. 
Patent n.a. Positive n.a. n.a. 
Entrepreneurial Environment 
Labor ,Market 
Rigidties 
Negative in 
early stage 
funds 
Negative 
Not significant 
for total VC 
investments but 
negative for 
early stage 
funds 
n.a. 
Corporate Gains 
Tax Rate Negative Negative Not significant Negative 
Level of 
Entreprenuership n.a. Positive n.a. n.a. 
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Political Risks 
Currption 
Negative in 
early stage 
funds 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Socio-economic 
Conditions Postive n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Internal Conflicts 
Negative in 
early stage 
funds 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2003), Bonini and Alkan (2009) 
 
Others explain the problem from the perspective of legal environment. La Porta et al. 
(1997) proves that the legal environment is crucial for the size and the activeness of a 
country’s venture capital market. Cumming et al. (2006) find that a well developed 
legal system is more important for venture capital divestments than a well developed 
capital market is. Pukthuanthong et al. (2007) analyze the relationship between 
European venture capital investments and the legal system, and find that an 
independent judiciary and a dynamic legal system are important contributors to a 
thriving venture capital market.  
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3. The history of European venture capital 
The emergence of modern European venture capital industry dated back to the late 
1970s, when UK and Ireland among all European countries attracted venture 
capitalists first. At that time most venture capital funds in Europe were initiated by 
American venture capital firms. Continental Europe followed in the early 1980s, 
where VC funds were frequently set up by large domestic banks (Andreas et al, 
2007). Today the volume of European venture capital market rank the second among 
all regions over the world. Figure 3. 1 illustrates the geographic distribution of 
venture capital investments around the world. U.S. occupied about 45% of the total 
global VC investments, while European followed with about 24% of the market 
share. According to the statistics of European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), 
UK, France and German were the top three countries in Europe that receive most 
venture capital investments in 2008, with 1.78 billion euro, 875 million euro and 
428million euro respectively. And they are also the most active economy entities with 
regard to venture capital. Exploring the development history of VC industries in these 
countries would give us a detailed insight about that of the Europe.  
U.S., 45%
Europe, 24%
Asia Paicfic, 17%
Mideast/Africa,
4%America(except
U.S), 10%
 
Figure 3. 1 The geographical distribution of global venture capital 
investments. Source: Chinese Venture Capital Yearbook 2007 
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3.1 UK 
For quite a long time, changing the unfavourable environment for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) had always been a big problem facing the UK government. 
As early as 1931, The MacMillan Committee Report stated that there was a chronic 
shortage of long term investment capital for SMEs in UK. And it recommends 
forming a company “to devote itself particularly to these smaller industrial and 
commercial issues.” After World War II, two companies, Industrial and Commercial 
Financial Corporation (ICFC) and Finance Corporation for Industry (FCI), were 
established to solve this financing problem facing small and medium-sized business 
by providing long term and permanent capital, the foundation of which declared the 
beginning of venture capital in England. These two companies were merged into one 
in 1970s and rebranded to Investors in Industry (3i), which now is still an active 
player in private equity market with 8 billion pounds under management. 
Partially due to supportive government policies and evolutions of the financial 
market, the number of English venture capital firms began to surge since 1980. The 
cut of the top rate of income tax in 1979 by Mrs Thatcher’s government stimulated a 
more entrepreneurial economy. The government further released the Business Start-
up Scheme which provided tax incentives for private investors who invested in 
unquoted companies (Mason and Harrison, 2002). In 1981, London Stock Exchange 
initiated an Unlisted Securities Market, which facilitated the flotation of SMEs’ 
equity and provided an exit route for venture capital investments. These three major 
events laid a solid foundation for the development of UK venture capital market in 
the following decades. 
The venture capital activities show a strong cyclic characteristic during its 
development in Britain. The total volume of VC investments in UK kept increasing 
until it peaked at 1.4 billion pounds in 1989. Then it shifted into a period of 
stagnation till 1993, during which lots of financial institutions stopped their 
businesses in venture capital. From 1993 to 2000, the market boomed again and 
reached 6.4 billion pounds in 2000, five times the number of early years in 1990s. 
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However, the burst of the internet bubble in that year severely damaged venture 
capital markets around the world. One year later, the investment volume shrank to 4.8 
billion pounds, about 75% of that of the previous year. This recession continued until 
2003 when the market became to recovery. In 2007, the volume of venture capital 
investment in UK was about 12 billion pounds, much higher than its previous peak. 
Comparing that the market volume in US today is still running at about 75% of its 
peak, the development in Britain is much quicker than US in recent years.  
 
Figure 3. 2 The Venture Capital Investment in UK from 1984 to 2008. 
Source: BVCA Private Equity and Venture Capital Report on Investment 
Activity 2007, EVCA Yearbook 2009 
 
The boom of UK venture capital market after 1990s was closely related to the 
prosperity of VC industry in US. A large amount of capital flew from America to the 
other side of the ocean for diversification of risks. According to a survey of British 
Venture Capital Association (BVCA), among all the capital raised by independent 
venture capital funds during 1997 and 2000, about 41% came from American 
investors. This kind of “spill-over” phenomenon also occurs in other European 
countries’ venture capital markets, reflecting the globalization characteristic of 
venture capital flows. 
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Since the establishment of the modern venture capital market in 1980s, the prior 
investment stage of British VC investments also keep changing. More and more 
venture capitalists put emphasis on MBO and MBI projects, while investments in 
start-ups are declining. There several reasons for this trend, including the higher 
return of MBO investments and shortage of classic venture capital skills (Mason and 
Harrison, 2002). Table 3. 1 illustrates that the ratio of capital invested in start-ups 
declines from 27.1% in 1984 to only 4% in 2008, while investments in MBO/MBI 
increase from 20.7% to 59% at the same period. 
Table 3. 1 Venture Capital Investment by Stage 
 Early stage (%) Expansion (%) MBO/MBI (%) 
1984 27.1 52.1 20.7 
1985 18.1 43.3 38.6 
1986 22.4 32.3 45.3 
1987 12.8 32.2 54.9 
1988 10 33.5 56.5 
1989 15.1 23.8 61.1 
1990 11.6 35.8 52.6 
1991 5.9 39.1 55 
1992 6.6 28.9 64.5 
1993 5.6 31.9 62.5 
1994 4.6 28.8 66.7 
1995 4 23.1 72.9 
1996 4.7 21.1 74.2 
1997 5.2 29.6 65.2 
1998 7.6 21.8 70.6 
1999 5.6 18.7 75.6 
2000 11 33.3 55.6 
2001 8.21 34.43 57.37 
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2002 6.58 30.67 62.75 
2003 6.46 21.28 72.26 
2004 5.32 17.88 76.80 
2005 5.61 28.64 65.76 
2006 9.25 29.28 61.47 
2007 3.63 31.88 64.49 
2008 4 37 59 
Source: BVCA Private Equity and Venture Capital Report on Investment 
Activity 2007, EVCA Yearbook 2009 
3.2 France  
France has the largest venture capital market in Continental Europe, second only to 
UK. The VC industry of France started in 1970s, composing of several technology 
innovations investment companies. The whole industry grew slowly at that time. In 
the late 1980s, government issued a series of incentive policies, including expanding 
the fundraising sources for venture capital and tax reduction regimes for VC 
investments. These policies trigger the rapid growth of French VC industry. The 
opening of Le Nouveau Marche in 1996 which has a lower threshold for SMEs to go 
public provided an important exit route for venture capitalists. 
Since 2000, the amount of venture capital investment has increased rapidly. In year 
2003, the Ministry of Research and the Ministry of Industry jointly promulgated the 
“Innovation Plan”, which give business angels significant tax exemptions and 
reductions and also offered sufficient tax incentives to encourage young innovatory 
SMEs to invest in R&D projects. These policies accelerate the process of 
transforming research results into business products and create a suitable environment 
for the venture capital industry. Unlike UK, the VC industry in France was heavily 
influenced by the burst of internet bubble. The investment in 2003 was actually 
higher than that of 2000, which to some extent was stimulated by the favourable 
policies of the French government. According to the latest statistics of EVCA, the 
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total amount of VC investment in 2008 was 8.7 billion euro, about 70% of 
investments in UK. 
 
Figure 3. 3 The Venture Capital Investment in France from 1990 to 2008. 
Source: EVCA Yearbook 2009 
3.3 German 
The development of venture capital in German is relative slow compared with UK 
and France, and it can be divided into six phases: 
The first period was 1960s when venture capital industry of German was born. 
During that time, small and medium sized business in German was in lack of 
sufficient funds for development. To solve the problem, the government of German 
suggested to found equity investment companies (KBGs) through which providing 
external long-term capital to SMEs. Like investment funds, KBGs collect capital 
from various financiers and invest it in a portfolio of companies. Such investments 
were to be in the form of a silent partnership and entrepreneur should buy back 
KBGs’ share in 5-10 years. In 1965 the first KBGs were founded, many of them as 
subsidiaries of banks (Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004). 
The second phase last from 1970 to 1980. During this period, two types of venture 
capital companies were established, namely MBGs and WFGs. MBGs provided 
SMEs with operation capital, but they seldom interfered with internal affairs of the 
portfolio companies. And they were not allowed to make investment in high-tech 
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start-ups. And the establishment of WFGs substituted MBGs in those blank areas 
whose main duty were to grant funds to SMEs’ technology innovation.  
The third phase started from 1980 till 1996. At this period, the German VC industry 
began to expand. The US venture capital mode was broadly accepted by their 
Germany counterparts. More and more local VC firms established and a number of 
foreign VC institutes opened their offices in German. And the government also 
published a series of encouraging policies for venture capital investments. Although 
the market turned to be active, the total amount invested by VC industry was still 
small. 
The fourth phase started in 1997 and end in 2001. The most important event during 
that period was the establishment of the Neuer Market. It serves as a further exit route 
for venture capitalists. Since then, the VC market in German began to boom. Before 
the burst of the internet bubble, the amount of VC investments in German was about 
10 times the amount of last period’s average.  
The industry has been stabilising and consolidating since 2001. Companies, mainly in 
the venture capital market, are exiting the market due to consolidation (BVK, 2008). 
As a result, early and later stage VC investments declined dramatically, while buyout 
investments kept rising and became the most important investment stage for VC 
funds in German. 
At the end of 2004, the market began to grow again and reached 7.45 billion euro in 
2007. Figure 3. 4 describes the last four phases since 1990. Compared with the VC 
industries in UK and France, the venture capital market in Germany was obviously 
smaller. According to EVCA statistics, the total amount invested in German in 2007 
was about 60% of that in France and 21.7% that in Britain. 
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Figure 3. 4 Venture Capital Investments in German from 1990 to 2007 
Source: BVK Statistics 
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4. Recent developments of venture capital in 
Europe 
4.1 Description of venture capital activities 
4.1.1 Fundraising activity 
Since the burst of the internet bubble in 2000, the venture capital market in Europe, 
like all the other places around the world, suffered from 4-years’ recession. However, 
the fund raised by European VC firms increased abruptly in 2005, and was kept at 
high levels in the following three years. The total amount raised in 2006 was two 
times the amount of 2000, the previous peak in European history. The rapid growth of 
the European market surpasses the performance of US market in recent two years. 
Although American VC industry is also recovering in these years, the total market 
volume in 2007 was only about 70% of the amount in 2000. There are huge 
discrepancies among European countries with regard to fundraising. In 2008, top 5 
countries accounted for almost 88% of the total amount raised in Europe. The UK VC 
market ranked the first with 46.3 billion euro, about 59% of the total amount. France 
and Sweden followed with 13.69% and 8.38% respectively.  
 
Figure 4. 1 European venture capital fundraising activity, 1998-2008. 
Source: EVCA Yearbook 2009 
 
 16 
Table 4. 1 European fundraising activity by countries, 2008 
Country Fundraising (€million) % of total european amount 
UK 46334 58.84% 
France 10778 13.69% 
Sweden 6597 8.38% 
Switzerland 3051 3.87% 
Deutschland 2400 3.05% 
Spain 2224 2.82% 
Netherlands 1579 2.01% 
Italy 1455 1.85% 
Norway 1268 1.61% 
Finland 903 1.15% 
Others 2159 2.74% 
European Total 78748 100.00% 
Source: EVCA Yearbook 2009 
4.1.2 Fundraising sources 
With regard to fundraising sources, pension funds, fund of funds (FOF), banks and 
insurance companies are major investors in the venture capital market of Europe. In 
2008, the capital provided by pension funds accounted for 25.1 percent of the total 
amount. FOFs and banks followed with 14.4% and 6.7% respectively. Figure 4. 2 
illustrates some changes in European venture capital fundraising sources as follows: 
Firstly, the importance of corporate investors in European venture capital market is 
becoming lower and lower. In 1998 corporate investors contributed about 10.3% of 
all the capital raised by venture capital funds, which ranked the third among all type 
of investors. But today they have become the least important type of investors which 
only provide 2.9% of the total amount in 2008. The logic behind this trend is that 
independent funds play a more and more important role in recent years. In the early 
days of the VC history in Europe, a large number of industrial companies established 
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their venture capital departments and made investments in small and medium-sized 
firms. These funds were usually called captive funds and were once active players in 
the market. However, most industrial companies closed their venture capital business 
after several rounds of market boom and bust. As a result, funds raised from 
corporate investors declined. 
 
Figure 4. 2 Type of investors in the European VC market. Source: EVCA  
Yearbook 2009 
 
Secondly, the importance of banks as capital providers is also declining dramatically. 
In 1998, banks are the most important type of investors in the VC market, accounting 
for 30.5% of the total. Although they are still the third important investors today, the 
amount of capital provided by them occupied only 6.7% of the total amount raised in 
Europe, the largest decline among all the type of investors. It reflects that the 
European financial system was heavily dependent on banks before, but was now 
more close to that of the US. The establishment of multi-level capital market helped 
the diversification of financing sources, alleviating the heavy burden on banking 
system. 
Thirdly, the FOFs and other sources play a more and more important role in the VC 
market. Combined with the second point above, they all illustrate the diversification 
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trend of financing sources for European venture capital funds, which implies that the 
venture capital market mode of Europe is turning similar to that of America. 
4.1.3 Investment activity 
Similar to fundraising, the European investment amount has been recovering since it 
declined in 2001, and reached a new record high of 73.8 billion euro in 2007. British 
VC companies invested 22.5 billion euro in 2008, about 41.61% of the total European 
investments and ranked the first among all European countries. France and German 
ranked the second and third with 16.21% and 13.08% respectively. As Figure 4. 3 
shows that top five countries occupied almost 83% of the total amount invested by 
European venture capital companies, reflecting that VC investment activities are 
highly concentrated in some countries in Europe. 
 
Figure 4. 3 European venture capital investment activity from 1990-2008. 
Source: EVCA Yearbook 2009 
 
Table 4. 2 European VC Investments by countries, 2008 
Country Investments(€million) % of european total 
UK 22525 41.61% 
France 8772 16.21% 
Deutschland 7082 13.08% 
Sweden 3404 6.29% 
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Italy 3071 5.67% 
Spain 1842 3.40% 
Netherlands 1788 3.30% 
Switzerland 1307 2.41% 
Norway 756 1.40% 
Others 3582 6.62% 
European total 54129 100.00% 
Source: EVCA Yearbook 2009 
4.1.4  Stage distribution of investmets  
Taking a close eye to the stage distribution of VC investments, buyout investments 
have been dominating the market and keep increasing in recent years. As Figure 4. 4 
illustrates, the percent of fund invested in buyouts increased from 51% in 1998 to 
79% in 2007. At the mean time, the percent of venture investments decreased from 
40% to 13.14%. 
 
Figure 4. 4 The trend of venture capital investments and buyout 
investments as percent of total from 1998-2008. Source: EVCA Yearbook 
2009 
It seems that European capitalists are becoming more and more interested in later 
stages investments. In 2008, about 69.74% of the total amount was invested in buyout 
transactions. Growth stage investments and later stage venture investments followed 
with 13.74% and 7.91% respectively. And it is to a large extent because of the higher 
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return for later stage investments, which will be explained in detail in some chapter 
below. 
This trend, however, is not very advantageous for the development of European’s 
economy. Generally speaking, the ventures including seed, start-up and later stage 
venture help the establishment of new companies and contribute most to economic 
development. As most researchers recognize that the transformation of technologies 
from pure laboratory findings to regular business is the most difficult issue for 
entrepreneurs, venture capital firms help these people overcome that difficulty. In an 
economy where more VC funds are invested in the early stage, more technologies 
will go out of the lab which improves the average technological level of the economy; 
more new companies will be established and more people are employed. All these are 
beneficial for the economic development. However, the time horizon of investment is 
typically long for these types of investments. For example, seed investment in a 
pharmaceutical company may exceed 10 years before it becomes profits for venture 
capitalists. As a result, these venture capitalists have to put more efforts in nurturing 
these firms, causing the cost of investment too high and that may explain why VC 
investments in early stage are unpopular in Europe these days. 
On the other hand, the investment in growth funds and buyout funds create less value. 
They involve investments in well-established companies which no longer grow 
rapidly and don’t suffer from the threat of bankruptcies as much as start-ups. No new 
technologies are brought to the society after these transactions; no new firms are 
established except the change of companies’ names and fewer workers are added to 
the new companies after transactions. Although the buyout fund may help companies 
reduce their operate cost through complicated mergers and acquisitions, thus 
increasing the efficiency of resources allocations in an economy, the total welfare 
improved under buyout will be smaller than those early stage ventures.  
We can also interpret it from the law of diminishing marginal outputs. The production 
function is increasing and concave in the amount of capital invested. For start-ups, 
venture investment are highly productive, as these companies are normally in 
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shortage of capital; for well-established companies, the effect of venture capital 
investment on output increase is limited as there’re already large sum of capital 
invested in these companies. As a result, the early stage venture investments are 
better than growth and buyout investment in terms of economic growth stimulation. 
This deduction can be partially verified by the empirical data provided in section 4.3 
below. 
Table 4. 3 Stage distribution of European VC investments, 2007-2008 
2007 2008 
Stages 
Amount(€ thousands) % Amount(€ thousands) % 
Seed 184694 0.25% 310131 0.57% 
Start-up 2453853 3.33% 2519316 4.65% 
Later stage venture 5371905 7.28% 4283613 7.91% 
Total venture 8010452 10.86% 7113060 13.14% 
Growth 3979566 5.39% 7438001 13.74% 
Rescue/Turnaround3 156772 0.21% 278162 0.51% 
Replacement capital4 3374969 4.57% 1549733 2.86% 
Buyout  58265802 78.96% 37749596 69.74% 
Total investment 73787561 100.00% 54128552 100.00% 
Source: EVCA Yearbook 2009 
4.1.5 Sectoral distribution of investments 
The sectoral distribution of European VC investments was quite a surprise as most 
funds didn’t flow into high-tech industries. Life sciences and electronics only ranked 
the fourth and fifth with regard to the amount invested. And most capital was 
engaged to traditional industries such as consumer goods and services, business and 
                                              
3 Fianancing made available to an exitsting business which has experienced trading difficulties, with a view to re-
establishing prosperity (EVCA). 
4 Purchase of existing shares in a company from another private equity investment organisation or from another 
shareholder or shareholders (EVCA). 
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industrial products etc. This situation is closely related to the phenomenon discussed 
before that European VC investments are dominated by buyout funds. As there are 
more opportunities for mergers and acquisitions in traditional industries, they attract 
more funds than high-tech companies.  
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Figure 4. 5 Sectoral distribution of European VC investments, 2006-2007. 
Source: EVCA Yearbook 2008 
4.1.6 Divestment by exit type 
In 2007, about 27 billion euro exited the VC market in Europe. Trade sale, secondary 
sale and repayments of loans and shares were three most important exit routes for 
European venture capitalists in last five years. Although initial public offering (IPO) 
enjoys the fame of extraordinary rate of return, it has always not been the major route 
in the European market. On average, only 5% of VC investments can be exited 
through IPOs in last five years. IPO is probably the most ideal exit route for venture 
capitalists and also the most difficult one, at least in Europe. 
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Figure 4. 6 Divestment activity in the European VC market, 2003-2007. 
Source: EVCA Yearbook 2008 
4.1.7 Performance of VC funds  
Table 4. 4 illustrates the net internal rate of return (IRR)5 to different type of 
investors from 1980 to 2007. Obviously, the IRR of buyout investments is much 
higher than that of venture investments, which explains why European VC investors 
prefer buyouts. What’s more, the net IRR was inversely related to VC fundraising 
and investment activities. The reason behind is that when IRR was high during 1990-
1994, more capital was attracted and flew into the market which cause the decline of 
IRR in the next period. This kind of interaction is quite similar to the “cobweb 
model”6 in economic theories. 
Table 4. 4 Net IRR to investors by vintage year 
Stage 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2007
                                              
5 The IRR is the interim net return earned by investors (Limited Partners), from the fund from inception to a stated date. 
The IRR is calculated as an annualised effective compounded rate of return using monthly cash flows to and from investors, 
together with the Residual Value as a terminal cash flow to investors. The IRR is therefore net, i.e. after deduction of all 
fees and carried interest. In cases of captive or semi-captive investment vehicles without fees or carried interest, the IRR is 
adjusted to created a synthetic net return using assumed fees and carried interest (EVCA). 
6 As wikipedia explains, the cobweb model is an economic model that explains why prices might be subject to periodic 
fluctuations in certain types of markets. Nicholas Kaldor analyzed the model in 1934, coining the term 'cobweb theorem'. 
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Venture 6.5 8.1 8.7 4.3 -2 0.4 
Buyouts 9.2 12.6 19.4 12.6 22 3.5 
All VC 9.5 8.9 15.6 9.8 16.2 3.1 
Source: EVCA Yearbook 2008 
4.2 Legal and tax enviroments 
In recent years, governments of European countries pay more and more attention to 
the importance of venture capital to economic growth. The European Union (EU) 
once claimed that venture capital is not only an essential element for promoting 
entrepreneurship and innovations, but also helps reduce the high unemployment rate 
problem in Europe. As a result, most countries in Europe are making efforts to 
providing better environments for the venture capital development. 
EVCA makes surveys periodically to assess the legal and tax environment for venture 
capital in different European countries. The assessment is based on three dimensions: 
the environment for limited partners and fund management firms, the environment for 
venture-backed companies and the environment for researchers, entrepreneurs and 
managers etc. And EVCA designs a comprehensive index to reflect these 
environments. The better the environment is, the smaller the value will be. The 
survey of 2006 came up with the following result: 
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Figure 4. 7 Scores of venture capital environments in European countries, 
20067. Source: EVCA, 2006 
 
From the figure, we find that Ireland, France and UK have the most favourable 
environment for venture capital activities in Europe. As a result, these countries have 
well development venture capital markets, as Table 4. 1 and Table 4. 2 illustrate. The 
environments in German, Sweden and Norway, on the other side, are rather though, 
and the market is comparatively small.  
4.3 The economic impact of VC acitvities on European 
economy 
As section 1 says that researchers found the positive impact of venture capital 
investments on job creation and innovation, this chapter will check out whether these 
effects really exist in Europe in recent years. 
                                              
7 The figure doesn’t include scores for central and eastern europe. 
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4.3.1 Job creations 
According to the survey conducted by EVCA in 2005, the number of employees in 
European venture and private equity-backed firms was about 6 million in 2004, about 
3% of the total effective European labor force and about 25% the number of 
employees working in European major companies which compose Dow Jones 
STOXX 600 index.  
From 2000 to 2004, venture and private equity-backed firms created one million job 
positions in sum with an annual growth rate of 5.4%, which is eight times the annual 
growth rate of total employment in the EU 25 member states (EVCA, 2005). During 
the same period, the number of employees in Dow Jones STOXX 600 companies 
decreased 0.1% annually.  
Among the one million positions created, about 420 thousands were offered by 
buyout-financed companies. From the experience of America, mergers and 
acquisitions always accompany with large scales of dismissal. However, it is not the 
case in Europe. From 1997 to 2004, employment in buyout-financed companies 
increased at an average annual growth rate of 2.4%, four times the annual growth rate 
of total employment in the EU 25 member states.  
The rest 630 thousands were created by venture-backed (including business angel-
backed) firms. And the average annual employment growth rate in venture-backed 
firms was extraordinarily high, which was 30.5% between 1997 and 2004, almost 40 
times the rate of EU 25 member states. It proves that early stage investments create 
more jobs that later-stage venture investments.  
Figure 4. 8 illustrates the difference in job creation capabilities of different type of 
companies. The employment growth rate in venture and buyout-financed firms is 
substantially greater than that of the European average and STOXX 600 index 
companies, fully reflecting the important contribution that venture capital made to the 
European economy regarding to job creation. 
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Figure 4. 8 Annual employment growth rate by type, 1997-2004. Source: 
EVCA, 2005 
4.3.2 Innovation stimulation 
The venture capital investments boost innovation activities because a large amount of 
fund flows into companies in their early or later-stage of development. And these 
companies show a great appetite for research and development. According to a 
survey conduct by EVCA in 2005, around 33% of employees in venture-backed 
companies work in R&D departments, 13% of which hold PhD degrees. The research 
expenses these companies spent every year account for 45% of their total expenditure 
and about 85% of their sales. And the annual average R&D expenses per employee in 
venture-backed firms was 50700 euro, which is 5 times more than the average of 
European 500 companies with the largest R&D spending (EVCA, 2005). 
Besides, venture-backed companies also have a larger amount of granted patents than 
traditional companies. As the same survey by EVCA reports that there are on average 
14 patent applications from a European venture-backed company every year, and 
among them 8 were granted. In these companies, every 12 people own a patent. As a 
comparison, about 10 thousands people have one patent on average in EU 25. 
Figure 4. 9 shows the positive correlation between the number of high-tech 
companies and venture capital investments in Europe. The dataset includes 17 
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European countries and the time span is between 2002 and 20078. The x-axis 
describes the number of high-tech companies; the y-axis measures the venture capital 
investment intensity, which equals to the value of VC investments divided by GDP in 
a given country. Therefore, each data point represents the combination of the number 
of high-tech companies and the VC intensity in country i  and year t . Then we find 
the positive correlation between the venture capital investment intensity and the 
number of high-tech companies, because venture capitalists tend to invest in regions 
with sufficient high-tech resources. And then these investments will in turn lead to 
more innovation activities by help financing high-tech companies, which forms a 
virtuous circle of venture capital investments. 
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Figure 4. 9 The relationship between European high-tech company 
numbers and venture capital investments. Source: EVCA, Eurostat 
In sum, the venture capital (including buyout funds and venture funds) did do a great 
contribution to job creations and innovation activities in Europe in recent years. The 
employment growth rate in venture-backed firms is much higher than that of the EU 
25 member states. And the innovation activities in companies with venture 
investments are more active than those without. What’s more, the earlier stage the 
                                              
8 Because of the availablility problem of data seriels, countries and time span included in analysis may change from time to 
time. In this particular situiation, the countries used including Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. 
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investment is in, the greater the contribution will be. These two empirical results 
confirm the theoretical findings of Dirk Engel (2004) and Josh Lerner (2000) etc. in 
Section 1.  
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5. What determines venture capital investments: 
the model 
The survey of venture capital activities in Europe saw great gaps in the development 
of venture capital markets in different countries. Some are well developed but others 
are comparatively small. Section 4.2 have discussed that the difference in tax and 
legal environments may explain these gaps to some extent. In this section, I present 
econometric specification about how to derive the equilibrium amount of VC 
investments in a given country. 
5.1 The basic model 
Following the approach of Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2003), the equilibruim 
amount of VC investments is determined by both the supply side and the demand side 
of the venture capital. Assuming a situation where venture capitalists provide an 
amount of capital, k  ,for companies in exchange for a share, α  ,of the profit 
earned by investees. Then venture capitalists will choose a level of investment 
amount that maximizes the following profit function: 
: ( ) ( )max
k
p a f k rkα −  (1)
α  is the proportion of profits that investees must share with venture capitalist, 
reflecting the price of venture capital funds. As venture capitalists usually not only 
provide capital for companies, but also offer various managerial advices and services, 
they can help their portfolio companies increase production efficiency. ( )p a  judges 
the effect of venture capitalists on the productivity of investees, a  represents the 
services offered by venture capitalists. ( )f k  is the production function of portfolio 
companies and is increasing and concave, i.e. ' ( ) 0f k >  and '' ( ) 0f k < . rk  represents 
the opportunity cost of venture capital investment, namely the profit that can be 
earned if this amount of capital was invested in other projects. Thus r  is the 
required rate of return for VC investments and can be measured by the interest rate 
for simplicity. 
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The first order condition of equation (1) gives the following result: 
'( ) ( )p a f k rα =   Or (2)
' ( )
( )
rf k
p a
= α  
(3)
If r  increases, ' ( )f k  increases, because ( )f k  is concave, k  will decrease. If α  
increases, ' ( )f k  decreases and k  will increase. As a result, the supply of venture 
capital funds is positively related to the price of funds and negatively related to the 
interest rate. 
Then the supply function of venture capital can be written as follows: 
0 1 2
sVC a a P a r= + +  (4)
sVC  is the supply of venture capital funds, P  is the price of venture capital. It is 
implied that 1 0a >  and 2 0a < . If we do a little rearrangement of the equation, we can 
get exactly the same supply function provided by Romain and van Pottelsberghe 
(2003) 
On the other side, the demand function of VC investments by Romain and van 
Pottelsberghe (2003) should be extended to include the impact of the capital market 
as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
dVC b b P b Y b MCAP b TO b EN b r= + + + + + + (5)
It is assumed that 1 0b < , because the increase in the price of venture capital will 
decrease the demand of VC investment. 2b , 4b and 5b  are all greater than zero, 
because a high GDP growth rate (Y ), a greater number of technology opportunities 
( TO ) and a better entrepreneurial environment all boost the demand of VC 
investments. 6b  is also greater than zero, as when the interest rate is raised, more 
companies tends to finance from venture capitalists, rather than from banks. The 
depth of the capital market matters ( MCAP ) matters because it influences the price of 
a company’s equities when they are sold to venture capitalists. If the capital market is 
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deep enough, the value of a company should be fully discovered by the market, thus 
entrepreneurs are willing to sell part of their shares to venture capitalists. As a result, 
a deeper capital market will boost VC demands, i.e. 3 0b > . 
It’s worthwile to discuss how venture capital investment activities are related to the 
GDP growth rate. As the last section illustrates, VC investments are able to create 
jobs in an economy entity and thus reducing the unemployment rate which will 
stimulate the economic growth rate in the short run.  
To understand the impact of venture capital investments on GDP growth rate in the 
long run, let’s consider the Schumpeterian approach to endogenous growth discussed 
by Barro & Sala-i-Martin (2003). It has long been recognized that the economic 
growth rate depends on the technological progress. Schumpeter internalized the 
technological progress through the “process of creative destruction”, focusing on how 
knowledge is created and used. The main idea is that innovations improve the quality 
of products and driven out low quality products. As a result, company who 
undertakes research activities in this period has a probability to earn some monopoly 
interests in the next period. The length of being a monopolist is random, until the next 
innovation occurs. And I’ll argue that VC investments may speedup the progress of 
technological improvement in an economy, thus increasing the economic growth rate. 
According to Jon Vislie (2009), the Schumpeterian approach gives out the steady-
state equilibrium number of labor in the research sector as follows: 
^
1
( , , , , ) 11
a rg L
an n g L a r ag
a
− − λ= λ = −+  
(6)
Where n  represents the number of workers in the research sector; g is the 
improvement of products’ quality; L  is the total skilled labor; a  represents the 
elasticity of demand; r  is the discount rate that judges the present value of future 
monopoly profit and λ  judges the productivity of research technology.  
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Assume that the number of workers in the research sector is increased, the level of 
technological progress will be higher, and thus the expected growth rate will be 
bigger in this economy. Then VC investments stimulate the economic growth rate 
through at least following two channels:  
First, with the help of venture capitalists’ expertise, a venture-backed firm becomes 
more fruitful in R&D. Thus the general productivity of research technology in an 
economy improved and λ  increased. From equation (6), an increase in λ  will 
increase the number of worker in R&D sector and the economic growth rate will be 
higher. Second, venture capital investments also help increase the size of innovation 
undertook by investees. Then g  is larger, which increases the monopoly profit in 
the next period. And the equilibrium number of labor in the research sector will be 
larger and economic growth rate increased. 
Thus the relationship between VC investments and GDP growth rate should be 
greater than zero, namely 2 0b > . Combining equation (4) with equation (5) together, 
we can get the equilibrium amount of VC investments in an economy: 
1 0 0 1 1 3 1 5 1 6 2 11 2 1 4
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a b a b a b a b a b a ba b a bVC Y MCAP TO EN r
a b a b a b a b a b a b
− −= + + + + +− − − − − −  
(7)
As 1 0a > , 1 0b < , 2b , 3b , 4b  and 5b  are all greater than zero, we can expect that 
GDP growth rate, the depth of the capital market, the technology opportunities and 
entrepreneurial environment are positively related to the amount of venture capital 
investments. The effect of interest rate on VC investments is ambiguous, which 
depends on the value 1 6a b  and 2 1a b . If 1 6 2 1a b a b> , then the sign is positive; negative 
otherwise. 
5.2 The extended model: how does legal environment 
matter? 
The analysis of Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2003) is concentrated in the slope of 
the function, namely how much more venture capital will be invested if the GDP 
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growth rate increases by one percent, etc. Other focuses their studies on the intercept 
of VC investment function, namely the 1 0 0 1
1 1
a b a b
a b
−
−  part. They are actually trying to 
answer this question: given all variables equal, what cause the differences in the VC 
investment amounts in different countries. The explanation goes to the differences in 
the legal environment of different countries. Pukthuanthong et al. (2007) make an 
empirical test on 19 Europe countries over the period 1994-2004 and find that 
countries with independent legal system tend to have larger amounts of VC 
investments; countries with a flexible, dynamic legal system also have active venture 
capital investment activities. 
In this paper, however, I’ll argue that the legal environment does not only affect the 
intercept of VC investment function, but also the slope of it. Because the legal 
environment won’t be changed dramatically in the short run, let’s use the index 
provided by EVCA (2006) to describe the comprehensive legal environment over the 
period 2002-2008 in European countries. And then focus on the interaction of the 
legal index with other variables.  
We can assume that the legal environment will influence the effect of public research 
and development expenses (public R&D) on VC investments. That is to say, the 
impact of public R&D on VC investments is composed of a fixed component effect 
and a component that varies across countries according to the level of legal 
environments. It is rational because the public investment in R&D will produce more 
technology opportunities in countries with favorable legal environments, thus the 
total amount of VC investments in that country will also be higher. 
Besides, I’ll also consider whether the type of legal system matters in the 
determination of VC investment. Following Pukthuanthong et al. (2007), I’ll use the 
dummy variable, CL, to define the type of legal system in a country. CL equals to one 
when a country adopts the case law tradition and zero otherwise. Generally speaking, 
a case law system is more flexible and adapts more easily to changing economics and 
financial circumstances (Pukthuanthong et al., 2007). As a result we should expect 
that countries with case law will have greater VC investments than those without. 
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Again, I will present the effect of the type of legal system on the VC investment by 
interacting with public R&D.  
Then the econometric model turns out to be the following equation: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , ,* * *i t i t i t i t i t i i t i i t i i t i tVC c c GDP c MCAP c i c RDP c EPL GDP c LT RDP c CL RDP= + Δ + + + + Δ + + + ε (7)
Where GDPΔ  reflects the GDP growth rate. MCAP  reflects the depth of the capital 
market. i  is the interest rate. RDP  represents the public investments in R&D. 
EPL  measures labor market rigidities, which will be explained in the next section. 
LT  reflects the legal environment in different countries and CL  indicates whether 
the country follows the case law tradition. 
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6. What determines venture capital investments: 
empricial evidence from the Europe 
Last section produces the econometric model for the equilibrium amount of VC 
investments. In this part, I’ll do an empirical test on 15 European countries over the 
period 2002-2008 using that model. The software used to do regression analysis is 
STATA 8. Let’s begin with the construction of dependent and independent variables. 
6.1 Dependent and independent variables 
I’ll use venture capital intensity (VCI) as the dependent variables, which makes the 
value of different countries comparable. VCI represents the average venture capital 
investment amount in a country divided by the country’s average GDP during the 
same period, i.e. VCI equals to VC investmnets/GDP. The values of VC investments 
are derived from EVCA, and GDP are derived from the European Statistic Bureau. 
The independent variables are divided into four categories. The first are factors that 
reflect economic conditions. It includes economic growth rate ( GDPΔ ), depth of the 
capital market ( MCAP ) and long term interest rate ( i ). GDPΔ  is calculated by 
dividing the nominal GDP of year t  by that of year 1t − , and then minus 1 to reflect 
the growth rate of the GDP. The depth of a country’s capital market are calculated by 
dividing the total value of equities traded in the country’s stock exchange to the 
average GDP of that country. The total value of equities traded in a country’s stock 
exchange is provided by the European Statistic Bureau. The long term interest rates 
are derived from the yields of government bond with 10 years’ maturity, which is 
also provided by the European Statistic Bureau. 
The second is the factor that reflects technology opportunities. Gompers and Lerner 
(1998) prove that R&D expenses in industrial companies are highly related to VC 
investments in a country. In my analysis, I’ll use the public R&D expenses ( RDP ) to 
reflect technology opportunities. The consideration of using public R&D expenses 
rather than R&D expenses in private sector is inspired by Margaret M. Blair’s 
 37
comments on Gompers and Lerner’s paper referred above. The original comments 
are: 
 “The authors have found that their R&D spending variables, in their state-level regressions, are 
highly significant predictors of-and prob-ably causally related to-venture capital activity. Such 
variables are manipulable by government policy and should be considered part of the arsenal of 
policy tools available to policymakers to stimulate venture capital activity. More research on this 
relationship is probably war-ranted.” 
To figure out the exact effect of government R&D policies on the activity of venture 
capital investments, running an empirical test with the public R&D expenditure 
variables may provide an explicit answer. And the result may also be instructive for 
governments who want to use public R&D as a policy tool to stimulate venture 
capital activity. 
The third is the entrepreneurial environment proxy. Following the approach of 
Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2003) and Bonini and Alkan (2009), I’ll use the labor 
market rigidity index ( EPL ) offered by OECD (2000) to judge the entrepreneurial 
environment. OECD originally produces the index to reflect the employment 
protection levels in different countries. It takes on values from 0 to 6, with 6 
representing the highest level of employment protection. It can be used to measure 
the labor market rigidity because high level of protection will cause layoffs difficult, 
thus increasing the labor market rigidity. And the entrepreneurial environment in a 
country with high labor market rigidity is usually tough. So we can expect that EPL  
will have a negative impact on VC investment activities. 
The last are legal environment variables LT  and CL , which have already been 
defined in the last section. The variable LT  takes on values from 0 to 3, with 0 
representing the best legal environments for venture capital activities. As a result, we 
should expect that LT  will have a negative effective on VC investments. And the 
dummy variable CL  should be positively impact the amount of VC investments.  
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Table 6. 1 Summary of variables 
Variables   Description Sources Expected Sign 
VCI  Venture capital intensity in a given country, which equals to VC investmnet / GDP. 
EVCA 
(2002-
2009) 
 
Independent 
variables     
Econonmic variables    
GDPΔ  Economic growth rate, which equals to 
1
1t
t
GDP
GDP−
−  Eurostat. + 
MCAP  Total value of equities traded in the stock exchange as a percentage of GDP. Eurostat. + 
i  Yields on the government bond with 10 years’ maturity Eurostat.  
Technology 
opportunities     
RDP  The amount of public R&D expenditures in the log ratio form. Eurostat. + 
Entrepreneurial 
environment     
EPL  
The labor market rigidity index ranging from 0 to 6, 
with 6 representing the highest level of market 
rigidities. 
OECD 
(2000) _ 
Legal environment     
LT  
The comprehensive legal environment index for 
European countries, ranging from 0 to 3, with 0 
representing the best legal environment for venture 
capital activities. 
EVCA 
(2005) - 
CL  
A dummy variable that equals to 1 if judges base 
their decision on case law and 0 otherwise. It’s 
generally recognized that countries with case law 
have higher levels of financial development. 
Pukthuan
thong et 
al. (2007)
+ 
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6.2 Data description 
The dataset contains 15 European countries over the period 2002-2008. These 
countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.  
The using of panel data has several advantages over cross-sectional and time series 
data. First, the estimated coefficient will be more accurate because panel data 
contains the information from both cross-sectional and time series data which lead to 
higher degrees of freedom and a larger number of observations in the dataset. Second, 
for fixed-effect regressions, the panel dataset can infer consistent or even effective 
estimate of parameters. Third, because the panel data is the repeated observation of 
the same cross section during the time period, it provides more details about the 
dynamics of economic relationships. As both the time span (seven years) and the 
number of countries (15 countries) under consideration here are not bigger enough for 
a well performed regression, using the panel dataset will solve this problem and 
provide a more robust estimate of parameters. 
The following table summarizes the dataset. The value of venture capital intensity, 
GDP growth rate, total stock market value and public R&D expenses are the average 
of the amount between 2002 and 2008, in million Euros. 
Table 6. 2 Summary statistics for the dataset of 15 European countries over 
the period 2002-20089 
 VC intensity GDP Total Value of Stocks Traded Public R&D EPL LT CL
Austria 0.000679 246761.2 87342.9 39.4 2.11 1.74 0
Belgium 0.001686 305065.6 201196.0 43.2 2.78 1.51 0
Denmark 0.002815 208068.5 93826.7 55.2 2.46 1.75 1
                                              
9 The values of EPL come from OECD (1994a), the values of CL are derived from Pukthuanthong et al. (2007). All other 
variable values come from the European Statistic Bureau and authors’ calculation. 
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Finland 0.0027 161110.0 134496.7 98.8 2.68 1.91 1
France 0.004341 1740112.9 1296500.0 97.1 2.63 1.36 0
Germany 0.001806 2287025.7 986722.9 96.8 1.76 2.15 0
Greece 0.000575 198037.5 109791.4 21.1 3.87 1.55 0
Italy 0.001728 1435856.4 584248.6 45.5 3.92 1.72 0
Netherlands 0.004037 521644.7 591210.0 75.2 2.28 1.6 0
Norway 0.001882 245056.0 138218.6 130.5 3.19 2.08 1
Portugal 0.001221 150314.3 79020.0 17.3 2.83 1.71 1
Spain 0.002251 912497.9 777107.1 41.2 2.59 1.52 0
Sweden 0.008802 299278.3 226046.7 52.8 1.51 2.12 1
Switzerland 0.001905 306587.4 714100.0 11.5 2.08 1.83 1
UK 0.012601 1824543.9 2176904.3 51.9 0.55 1.46 1
Source: EVCA, Eurostat, OECD (2000) and Pukthuanthong et al. (2007). 
6.3 Empirical results 
Besides all those explanatory variables I’ve included in the regression model, there 
are some unobservable factors like regional culture, investment atmosphere etc. 
which vary across countries causing the different level of venture capital investments 
in different countries. At the same time, these factors are influenced by the different 
value of explanatory variables. For example, when the GDP growth rate is increased, 
the expected profit of investment will be higher and the general investment 
atmosphere will be improved. As a result, I’ll choose the fixed effect regressions 
using the within estimator to capture all those unobservable country-specific factors. 
The empirical analysis starts with the estimation of VC intensity on each single 
independent variable listed in the equation (7). Table 6. 3 illustrate the estimation 
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results. The GDP growth rate, depth of the capital market and public R&D 
expenditures are positively related to VC intensity which exactly fit our model and 
the coefficients are significant. The long term interest rate is negatively related to VC 
intensity, suggesting the supply effect of interest rates is stronger than the demand 
effect, i.e. 1 6 2 1a b a b<  in equation (6). It’s rational because entrepreneurs should have 
a shorter vision of financial constraints than fund providers (Romain and van 
Pottelsberghe, 2003). 
Table 6. 3 Estimation results of the VC intensity, single independent 
variables 
Dependent variable: VC intensity ( /VC GDP ) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Regressions 1 2 3 4 
Econonmic variables      
GDP growth rate GDPΔ
0.0148**
(2.07) 
   
Depth of the capital market MCAP  
0.0025**
(2.60) 
  
Long term interest rate i    
-0.00115** 
(-2.25) 
 
Technology opportunities      
Public R&D expenditures RDP    
0.0033** 
(2.42) 
Control variables     
Country-specific intercept YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.096 0.54 0.04 
Notes: * indicates that the parameter is significant at 10% probability threshold; ** indicates 5% 
probability threshold and *** indicates 1% probability threshold. 
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Then we run the analysis that includes all potential explanatory variables. Column 1 
includes the effect of both the comprehensive legal environment and the type of legal 
systems. Column 2 considers the effect of comprehensive legal environment only and 
Column 3 considers the effect of the type of legal systems only. All signs of 
coefficients are in line with our expectation, and most of them are significant at 10% 
probability threshold.  
Table 6. 4 Estimation results of the VC intensity, complete model and take 
the legal environment into consideration 
Dependent variable: VC intensity ( /VC GDP ) 
 OLS OLS OLS 
Regressions 1 2 3 
Econonmic variables     
GDP growth rate ,i tGDPΔ  
0.040** 
(2.10) 
0.062*** 
(2.83) 
0.040** 
(2.06) 
Depth of the capital market ,i tMCAP  
0.012*** 
(4.31) 
0.014*** 
(4.24) 
0.013*** 
(4.54) 
Long term interest rate ,i ti  
0.001* 
(1.8) 
0.001** 
(2.05) 
0.001* 
(1.92) 
Technology opportunities     
Public R&D expenditures ,i tRDP  
0.023 
(1.1) 
0.011 
(0.51) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.81) 
Entrepreneurial environment    
Labor market rigidity ,
*i i tEPL GDPΔ
 
-0.018* 
(-1.68) 
-0.027*** 
(-2.22) 
-0.020** 
(-1.94) 
Legal environment    
Comprehensive legal 
environment for venture 
,*i i tLT RDP  
-0.020* 
(-1.66) 
-0.013 
(-0.9) 
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capital activity 
Type of the legal system ,*i i tCL RDP  
0.032*** 
(3.96) 
 
0.030*** 
(3.66) 
Control variables    
Country-specific intercept YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6684 0.096 0.54 
Notes: * indicates that the parameter is significant at 10% probability threshold; ** indicates 5% 
probability threshold and *** indicates 1% probability threshold. 
Now we can analysis the influence of legal environments on the effectiveness of 
government policies. If a government wants to stimulate venture capital activities in 
its country by making more investment in public R&D expenses, it should be aware 
that the legal environment may influence the effectiveness of its policy. Equation (1) 
shows that the coefficient of the comprehensive legal environment variable is 
negative. This implies that the increase in the value of comprehensive legal 
environment index will decrease the effect of public R&D on VC investments. As a 
high value of the legal environment index represents a worse legal environment for 
VC activities. The previous implication is equivalent to that a worse legal 
environment will diminish the effectiveness of public R&D investments as a policy 
tool. 
Let’s consider how the market equilibrium is achieved: 
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Figure 6. 1 The impact of legal environment on the equilibrium VC 
investments. Source: Author’s construction 
In the figure, the x-axis represents the amount of VC investments; the y-axis 
represents the price of VC funds. sVC  is the supply curve of VC investments defined 
by equation (4) and dVC  is the demand function of VC investment defined by 
equation (5). Assuming there are two countries that both decide to make more 
investments in the public R&D to boost the VC activities in their counties, and 
country 2 has a better legal environment than country 1. Then the demand curve of 
country 2 will shift upward to 2dVC . And the demand curve of country 2 will shift 
upward to 1dVC , which is lower than 2dVC  because a worse legal environment 
diminish the stimulation policy. As a result, in the new equilibrium, the VC 
investments amount in the country with a good legal environment will be larger than 
the country with a bad one.  
6.4 Summary  
My regression results confirm the previous researches by Gompers and Lerner 
(1998), Jeng and Wells (2000), Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2003) and Bonini and 
Alkan (2009). The venture capital investment is positively related to the GDP growth 
rate, depth of the capital market, entrepreneurial environments and public R&D 
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expenditures. What’s more, I add the legal environment into the demand function of 
VC investment and find that a bad legal environment will diminish the effectiveness 
of government policies. Points that are instructive to the government can be 
concluded as follows: 
1. The amount of venture capital investments is positively related to the economic 
growth rate. Countries with rapid growth rate can expect to see the rapid 
development of VC activities. 
2. The amount of venture capital investments is positively related to the depth of a 
country’s capital market. Serving as an important exit route, the depth and 
liquidity of a capital market determine the attractiveness of a country to venture 
capitalists. The historical development of European venture capital market also 
proves it, as the total VC investments boomed since the opening of Euro new 
market in 1996. Governments who want to boom the venture capital investments 
should establish a well-developed capital market. 
3. The entrepreneurial environment also matters in venture capital activities. For 
countries with higher rigidities in the labor market, the total amount of VC 
investments will be smaller. As a result, countries make a balance between the 
protection of employment and the development of VC markets. Too much 
protection will decrease venture capital activities and to less protection may cause 
other social problems. 
4. Public R&D spending can be used as a policy tool by governments to boost 
venture capital activities. However a bad legal environment will diminish the 
effectiveness of the policy. As a result, the government should not only make 
more public R&D investments, but also try to improve the legal environment for 
venture capital activities. And generally, in countries with case law tradition, the 
effectiveness of their stimulation policies on VC investments will be greater. 
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7. The venture capital market in China 
7.1 Recent developments in Chinese VC market: a 
comparison with the Europe 
As Chinese official statistics has not covered the activity in the venture capital 
market, nor does China has authorized venture capital association like EVCA. The 
dataset used in this paper comes from the CVSource database provided by 
ChinaVenture Investment Consulting Group, a leading private equity information 
provider in China. 
7.1.1 Fundraising activity 
According to ChinaVenture (2010), the total amount raised by the venture capital 
firms in China arrived at 19.9 billion US dollars and 12.33 billion US dollars in 2008 
and 2009. Compared with the 78.7 billion euro raised in Europe in 200810, the capital 
raised in China was only 17.5% the amount of Europe, assuming that one euro 
equalled 1.4 dollars at that time. So from the perspective of total fundraising amount, 
the venture capital market in china is still quite small and on its early stage of 
development. 
                                              
10 Because I haven’t got the European data for 2009 (maybe haven’t been published). All comparison will be based on 
2008’s value in this Section. 
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Figure 7. 1 The fundraising amounts in China, 2008-2009. Source: 
CVSource 
 
Among the 12.3 billion US dollar raised in 2009, about 58% was provided by 
Chinese local institutional investors which are major players in the market. Another 
31% was provided by foreign investors. And the rest 11% was offered by Sino-
foreign joint ventures. The diversification of fund sources is much similar to the 
situation in Europe, reflecting the globalization trend of venture capital flows. 
Domestic
58%
Foreign
31%
Sino-foreign
11%
 
Figure 7. 2 Contribution of different sources to fundraising in China, 2009. 
Source: CVSource 
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7.1.2 Investment activity 
Figure 7. 3 illustrates the historical trend of VC investment activities in china from 
2006 to 2009. The total amount invested in 2009 is 22.4 billion US dollars, a 43.6% 
increase from the previous year. However, it is still a tiny number compared with the 
Europe. Take 2008 as an example, the investment amount in China was only 20% of 
the Europe.  
Comparing it with Figure 4. 3, we find that the impact the Chinese VC industry 
suffered from the global financial crisis of 2008 was much smaller than the European 
VC industry did. The investment amount of Europe in 2008 decreased almost 37% 
from the previous year, while the amount in China only decreased 15.6% at the same 
time. The reason behind this is that the EU venture capital industry is more closely 
related to their US counterparts than China does. Many VC firms in Europe are 
affiliates of American VC companies and a large sum of capital flow from US 
investors to the EU venture market. When the financial crisis broke out in the United 
States, American investors became cautious about their investments in Europe and 
some even withdrew their fund back, all of which lead to the sharp decline of the 
venture capital activity in Europe. 
 
Figure 7. 3 Venture capital investments in China, 2006-2009. Source: 
CVSource 
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7.1.3 Stage distribution of investments 
Despite that the total volume of the VC market in China is so much smaller than the 
Europe, the investments in early and later-stage ventures are however, quite 
comparable. In 2008, that part of investment was 5 billion US dollars in China, and 
7.1 billion euro in Europe. Besides, the expansion speed of venture investments is 
much higher in China. Figure 7. 4 shows that the investment amount in early and 
later-stage ventures keeps increasing in China in recent years. The average annual 
growth rate between 2002 and 2008 is 45%, while at the same time the investment in 
early and later-stage ventures in Europe decreased by 16.9%. 
 
 
Figure 7. 4 Investment activities in early and later-stage ventures in China, 
2002-2009. Source: CVSource 
 
The percentage of fund invested in early and later-stage ventures in China is higher 
than that in Europe as well. In 2009, the venture investment accounted for 16.81% of 
the total investment. The figure of 2008 was even higher, which was 32.08% and 
much greater than the 13.14% of Europe. In section 4, the experience of Europe has 
shown that early stage investment will be more beneficial to job creations and 
innovations. Therefore, a higher percentage of early stage investments will make 
greater contributions to the Chinese economy. 
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Table 7. 1 Chinese VC investments by stage, 2009 
Stage Amount ($million) % of Chinese total 
Early Stage 89.43 0.40% 
Development Stage 2452.94 10.95% 
Expansion Stage 1005.08 4.48% 
Profitability Stage 219.24 0.98% 
Total Venture 3766.69 16.81% 
Growth Capital 3032.68 13.53% 
PIPE 14720.57 65.68% 
Buyout 891.47 3.98% 
Total Investment 22411.41 100.00% 
Source: CVSource 
 
Accordingly, the buyout market in China is too less active than that in Europe. The 
buyout market has always been the most important segment of the European venture 
capital market and investment in buyouts in 2007 and 2008 accounted for 78.96% and 
69.74% of the total investments respectively. But it is not the case in China, as Table 
7. 1错误！未找到引用源。 shows that the investments in M&As only occupied 
3.98% of total investment. This phenomenon goes in line with the economic 
environment of China. Generally speaking, the establishments of new enterprises tend 
to be more frequent in an emerging economy than in developed countries, while the 
latter have more chances in the field of M&As. 
Among all the investment stages, the private investment in public equity (PIPE) 
attracted the highest percentage of money. For companies, PIPE is an alternative 
method of financing to secondary offerings. But it’s more time efficient because it 
has less regulatory issues with the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). And because PIPE doesn’t accept individual investments, it belongs to a 
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kind of private equity. The scale of PIPE In 2009 reaches 14.7 billion dollars in 
China, accounting for 65.68% of the total investments. 
7.1.4 Sectoral distribution of investments 
The industry selection of venture capital investments in China is also quite different 
than that of the Europe. Finance, Chain Store & Franchise and Energy are the top 
three industries that attracted most PE investments in 2009, while Internet, IT and 
Manufacturing are the top three industries that attracted most VC investments. And 
the VC/PE investments in Europe were clustered in the industry of consumer goods 
and services, commercial and industrial products and telecommunication. This is 
because the venture capital market is dominated by buyout funds. These funds 
usually invest in traditional sectors like consumer goods and services etc., because 
companies in these sectors have more chances of mergers and acquisitions. While in 
China, the private investment in public equity (PIPE) dominates the market. And this 
kind of funds usually invest in sectors with monopoly power, like the finance sector 
and the energy sector etc.. With regard to early stage ventures, both venture 
capitalists in China and those in Europe focus on high-tech industries like IT etc. 
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Figure 7. 5 Sectoral distribution of Chinese VC investment, 2009.    
Source: CVSource 
 52 
7.1.5 Exit activity 
As there are no data about the sum of divestment in China, this chapter will use the 
financing activities of venture-backed firms to reflect the exit potentials for Chinese 
venture capital companies. Unlike the European market, IPO is the most commonly-
used exit route for venture capitalists in China. According to CVSource database, 73 
venture-backed enterprises finished initial public offerings in 2009 and the amount 
raised was 13.75 billion dollars. The number of IPOs increased by 356.3% and the 
amount of total capital raised increased by 214. 9% than the previous year. 
Comparatively, divestment through M&As is much less common in China. 2009 saw 
16 VC-backed M&A transactions with a total amount of 4.37 US dollars. 
The rate of return for IPO is extremely high and varies from time to time with 
substantial fluctuations. The average rate of return was 500% for all IPOs in 2007, 
and declined to 200% in 2008 because of the slump in the capital market. It kept 
running at a low level in the first three quarters of 2009, which was 150% but 
skyrocketed to 1490% in the last quarter of 2009. The substantial increase in the rate 
of return in the last quarter was closely related to the launch of the Chinese second 
board, which claimed to be the Chinese version of NASDAQ or Euro new market. 
Companies listed in the second board were valued at extremely high PE ratios 
(almost 100 on average, while PE ratios on the main board were only 25 at that time), 
creating a large sum of wealth to their venture capital investors. For example, the 
book return on investment (ROI) of ChinaEquity’s investment in Huayi Brothers was 
2160% when the latter went public in October 2009. ChinaEquity is a Chinese 
leading private merchant bank engaging in VC and PE and Huayi Brothers is the 
largest private film production company in China. The investment of Shenzhen 
Capital Group Co., Ltd., the largest venture capital investment institution in China, in 
the ChinaNetCenter also achieved 21.27 times return of their original investments. 
The highest book ROI belongs to Drehmo’s investment in Qingdao Tgood Electric 
Co., Ltd, which reached 225.10 times. The launching of the Chinese second board has 
to a large extent facilitated the flotation of SMEs’ equity and it can be predicted that 
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the high ROI will attract more and more fund to flow into the venture capital market 
in the following years.  
 
Figure 7. 6 The capital raised by IPOs of venture-backed firms and the 
average rate of return for venture investors, 2008-2009. Source: CVSource 
 
Comparing to the venture capital market in Europe, the exit routes in China is quite 
scarce. There are over 7 kinds of exit routes for European venture capitalists 
including trade sale, secondary sale and repayments of loans and shares etc. But in 
china, only IPOs play important roles for venture capital divestments. It happens 
because the transfer of equity relies not only on a well-developed stock market but 
also on other kinds of capital markets, especially the over-the-counter market (OTC). 
As the stock market is relatively mature in China with sufficient regulations, IPOs 
become the most reliable routes for the transfer of equities. But for other markets, 
they are still on their early stage of development and in lack of related regulations, 
thus venture capital investments in China are difficult to exit through other methods 
undertook in Europe. It is therefore urgent for Chinese government to establish a 
well-developed multi-level capital market in order to boost domestic venture capital 
activities. 
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7.2 The imbalanced regional development of venture 
capital in China 
Just like the situation in Europe, the development of venture capital in different 
provinces of China also presents great discrepancies. Take year 2009 for example, the 
venture capital investment was heavily concentrated in the eastern part11 of China 
because of the well developed financial services industry and a relative wealthy 
economic environment in that region. The second went to the western part of China 
due to the large storage of energy resources in that place. As energy prices 
skyrocketed in recent years, investment in energy resources is extremely hot in 
today’s China. The middle part of China attracted the least amount of venture capital 
investments. 
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Figure 7. 7 Regional distribution of venutre capital investments in China, 
2009. Source: CVSource 
 
Table 7. 2 provides a more detailed description about the regional distribution of 
venture capital investment in China. Top five provinces or cities that attracted most 
private equity investment in 2009 were Beijing, Shanghai, Neimenggu, Liaoning and 
                                              
11 The defination of eastern, middle and western comes from the document named “A notice of related policies for the 
development of western part of China”, issued by the Central People’s Government of PRC in Dec 12th 2000. 
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Anhui. The sum of the capital invested in Beijing and Shanghai accounts for 76.21% 
of the total investments. Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shenzhen ranked 
top five with regard to the VC investments. Again, the sum of investments in top 2 
regions, Beijing and Shanghai, occupied 41.58% of the total amount. It reflects the 
highly regional concentration of venture capital investments in China, which to a 
large extent because of the fact that most venture capital firms are located in Beijing 
and Shanghai. As venture capital investments are typically involved with problems of 
asymmetric information, VC firms usually invested in companies close to them 
geographically for better supervision.  
The discrepancy may also caused by different policies in different provinces. 
Generally speaking, Beijing and Shanghai provide more favourable policies for the 
development of venture capital, while other provinces don’t. For example, in Jun 2nd, 
2009 and Jan 4th, 2010, Shanghai and Beijing issued documents to encourage foreign 
venture capital firms open their offices in these two regions, and claimed that foreign 
investors would enjoy the same status as domestic firms. The favourable environment 
attracts more VC/PE firms, thus venture capital activities are more active in these two 
regions. 
At last, the imbalance also comes from the fact that Beijing and Shanghai have 
advantages in human resources, innovation resources (these two cities have the most 
famous universities and research centres in China) and financial service platforms. 
All reasons above are in line with those that explain why some countries in Europe 
have well-developed venture capital market while others don’t in section 5. 
Table 7. 2 Regional distribution of venture capital investments in China, 
2009 
PE Investmens VC Investments 
Region 
Amoutn($ million) % Amoutn($ million) % 
Beijing 13112.1 70.33% 1044.56 27.73% 
Shanghai 1095.68 5.88% 521.67 13.85% 
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Jiangsu 388.7 2.08% 186.6 4.95% 
Zhejiang 247.08 1.33% 126.08 3.35% 
Shenzhen 50 0.27% 127.36 3.38% 
Guangdong 349.83 1.88% 135.51 3.60% 
Hubei (-)12 (-) 84.64 2.25% 
Shandong 75.49 0.40% 65.96 1.75% 
Hunan 70.08 0.38% 50.65 1.34% 
Sichuan 82.74 0.44% (-) (-) 
Fujian 171.4 0.92% (-) (-) 
Henan 191.7 1.03% (-) (-) 
Anhui 487.34 2.61% (-) (-) 
Xinjiang 68.09 0.37% (-) (-) 
Chongqin 58.41 0.31% (-) (-) 
Liaoning 515.13 2.76% (-) (-) 
Tianjin 113 0.61% (-) (-) 
Neimenggu 965.55 5.18% (-) (-) 
Hainan 326.46 1.75% (-) (-) 
Hebei 60 0.32% (-) (-) 
Others 215.84 1.16% 1423.65 37.80% 
Total 18644.72 100.00% 3766.69 100.00%
Source: CVSource 
                                              
12 Not available. 
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7.3 Problems of China’s venture capital market 
As the analysis of last two chapters show that the venture capital industry is growing 
rapidly in China in recent years, but the total market size of the industry is still small. 
In 2008, the amount raised by the venture capital industry in China was roughly 
17.5% of the Europe, and the total investment amount was about 20% at the same 
time. There are some problems constitute the bottleneck for the development of 
venture capital industry in China. 
Firstly, the source of fundraising in China is scarce. Figure 4. 2 reflects that various 
kinds of investors providing fund for the venture capital industry in Europe, including 
pension funds, FOF, banks and insurance companies etc. In China, however, banks, 
pension funds and insurance companies are still not allowed to invest in venture 
capital funds because of the high risks deemed by relevant regulatory government 
agencies. The experience of Europe shows that the opening of venture capital market 
to pension funds and insurance companies dramatically boost the prosperity of 
venture capital activities. Therefore, the Chinese government should come up with a 
solution so as to open the venture capital market for pension funds, banks and 
insurance company investors as soon as possible. 
Secondly, there aren’t enough exit routes for venture capitalists in China. IPOs are 
the only major method to divestments in China while European venture capitalists 
can exit through trade sales, secondary sales and repayments of loans and shares etc. 
The reason is that we don’t have a well developed multi-level capital market which 
should include a strong main board, a deep secondary board and an active OTC 
market. As the portfolio companies of venture capital funds are usually too small to 
satisfy the requirement of listing on the main board, a well developed supplements 
like the secondary board and OTC market are extremely important for these 
investments. The Chinese secondary board was just launched on Oct 30th 2009, but 
the threshold of listing is still higher than its European counterpart, the Euro new 
market. Besides, the OTC market has not well developed as well. The OTC market 
for venture capital in China is mainly composed of provincial propriety trading 
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markets. However, these propriety trading markets are typically too small and lack 
sufficient influences nationwide. It can be noticed that almost every province has its 
own propriety trading market. What’s more, some big or medium cities also launched 
one. The segmentation between these markets severely gears down the flow of 
information and increases the searching costs for both buyers and sellers. The 
Chinese government should study on how to consolidate these small markets into a 
large uniform one to facilitate the exit of venture capital investments. 
Thirdly, the lack of related laws and regulations also negatively influence the venture 
capital activities in China. Till now, there haven’t been any specific regulations 
governing the venture capital industry. As an industry with huge amount of 
asymmetric information, however, a comprehensive system of regulation is beneficial 
to all players in the market. The development history of Europe also illustrates that 
countries with better legal environment, including sufficient supervision, have better 
developed venture capital markets. 
Last but not least, there aren’t many intermediaries providing venture capital services 
in the market, which may be result from the fact the overall size of the market is still 
too small. In Europe, investment banks, accounting firms, law firms, consultant 
companies and asset assessment institutions etc. all do business related to venture 
capital. For example, accounting firms like PWC, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
Deloitte published reports analyze the hotspot of venture capital investments every 
year to help venture capitalist grasp opportunities. But in China, these kinds of 
services are quite scarce.  
 59
8. Conclusions and Suggestions 
The venture capital investments do have positive impacts on the economic growth, 
innovation and job creations from the perspective of Europe. The paper goes through 
a complete survey of the venture capital activities in Europe; analyzes the model that 
determines the equilibrium amount of VC investments and runs an empirical analysis 
on 15 European countries over the period 2002-2008. The analysis includes the 
public R&D expenses variable, and takes legal environments into consideration, 
which haven’t been discussed by previous related researches. And we can get the 
conclusions as follows: 
1. The prosperity of venture capital market needs various kinds of players. Since 
Europe allows pension funds to invest in venture capital funds, the market grows 
rapidly. In today’s Europe, pension funds, banks, FOFs, insurance companies, 
industrial investors and governments are all active players in the venture capital 
market. 
2. The development of venture capital needs supports from governments. From the 
perspective of Europe, venture capital investments are usually more active in 
countries with favourable policy environments. For example, the British 
government issues lots of encouraging policies for venture capital firms and 
investors, while quite few are offered by the Germany governments. As a result, 
although German is a bigger economic entity than UK in terms of GDP, the 
venture capital market in German is smaller than that in Britain.  
3. The development of venture capital relies on a deep multi-level capital market, 
including the main board, secondary board and OTC markets. These markets 
serve as important exit routes for venture capitalist, thus directly influencing 
venture capital investment activities. The launching of the European secondary 
board, Euronm, in 1996 significantly boosted the amount of venture capital 
investments, as illustrated by Figure 4. 3. The regression outcome in section 5 
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also reflects a strong positive relationship between venture capital investments 
and the depth of the capital market. 
4. Public R&D spending can be used as a policy tool by governments to boost 
venture capital activities. However a bad legal environment will diminish the 
effectiveness of the policy. As a result, the government should not only make 
more public R&D investments, but also try to improve the legal environment for 
venture capital activities. 
After that, the paper analyzes the recent development of the venture capital market in 
China, makes a comparison with the Europe and concludes some potential problems 
hindering the development of VC market in China. To establish a strong venture 
capital market in China, experience from Europe is valuable for the government.  
First, we should speed up the construction of a multi-level capital market. The 
regression analysis shows that the depth of capital market significantly impact 
venture capital activities. The increase of total capital market value to GDP by 1%, 
the venture capital intensity will be increased by 1.3%. Therefore the launch of 
China’s secondary board in 2009 is a meaningful improvement of the existing capital 
market system and will be beneficial to the development of venture capital in China. 
However, we still have to study on how to found a nationwide OTC market for 
venture capital divestments. 
Second, the government should spend more on scientific researches and education 
programmes. Although the Chinese government has always been stressing the 
importance of education as a basic strategy for economic growth since 1995, the 
public expenditure on education is still too low, about 2.81%-3.48% of GDP in recent 
years. While the amount in Europe is much higher, ranging from 3.48% (Slovakia) to 
8.28% (Denmark) in 2005. R&D expenses and education expenses are important for 
venture capital investments in terms of the fact that they can boost innovations which 
is extremely important for early-stage ventures. 
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At last, the government should create a favourable legal environment for venture 
capital activities. The empirical test of Europe finds that the legal environment will 
significantly influence the effectiveness of the stimulation policy. If the legal 
environment is too tough, increasing in government spending on public R&D may 
have no effects on venture capital activities. As a result, establishing a good legal 
environment is crucial to the development of the venture capital market. 
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